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I. LEASE DISPUTES 
A. Calculation of Lease Royalties 
In Culpepper v. EO G Resources, Inc., EOG Resources, Inc. was the 
successor-in-interest to the lessee's rights under a mineral lease that 
required the lessee to pay a royalty on natural gas, calculated at three­
sixteenths of the "amount realized by [l]essee computed at the mouth 
of the well."1 EOG produced natural gas and sold it at a location 
away from the well. In calculating the royalty it paid to the lessors, 
EOG used the "work back" or "net back" method, in which transpor­
tation costs incurred by the operator were deducted from the sales 
price of the natural gas, with the royalty being paid on the difference.2 
The lessors brought suit, arguing that deduction of transportation 
costs was improper.3 The district court agreed and entered judgment 
for the lessors, but the Louisiana Second Circuit reversed.4 Citing 
prior jurisprudence, the appellate court stated that deduction of post­
production costs is proper when calculating a royalty that is based on 
the "amount realized . . .  at the mouth of the well."5 
B. Commencement of Operations 
In Cason v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., Mr. and Mrs. Cason 
granted a mineral lease that contained a five-year primary term that 
expired on May 31, 2010.6 The lease contained a clause stating that 
the lease would remain in effect beyond the primary term for as long 
as the lessee was "engaged in operations for drilling."7 After multiple 
assignments and partial assignments, a portion of the lease was held 
by a subsidiary of Chesapeake Operating.8 The lessees did not spud a 
well or obtain a drilling permit before the expiration of the primary 
term, but prior to the end of the primary term, Chesapeake took steps 
in preparation for drilling.9 For example, it conducted a survey of a 
drill site. staked an area for the well pad, and began to clear trees 
from the area.10 Several weeks after the end of the primary term, 
Chesapeake spudded a well at the site and eventually complete d  the 
well.11 
I. -�ee Culpepper v. EOG Res., Inc., 92 So. 3d 1142, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
2. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, MANUAL OF 01L & GAs 
Tt'RM� 597-98, 1067-68 (14th ed. 2009) (defining "netback method" and "work-back 
valuation method"). 
3. Culpepper, 92 So. 3d at 1143. 
4. Id. al 1142 . 
.5. Id. al 1143. 
�: ��son v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 92 So. 3d 436, 438 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
8. Id. al 437. 
9. Id. al 439. 
10. Id. 
11. See id. at 438-39. 
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But Mr. and Mrs. Cason granted a mineral lease to another com­
pany for the same land and filed suit against Chesapeake and several 
other defendants that held an interest in the original lease, seeking a 
judgment that the original lease had terminated.12 The Casons con­
tended that Chesapeake's activities prior to the expiration of the pri­
mary term did not constitute "operations for drilling" and therefore 
had not maintained the original lease beyond the primary term.13 The 
district court disagreed and entered judgment for the defendants.14 
The Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed.15 The appellate court cited 
numerous prior cases in which Louisiana courts have held that spud­
ding a well is not necessary in order for a company to be engaged in 
"drilling operations" or for the company to have commenced "drilling 
operations. "16 Instead, it is sufficient that a company has begun signif­
icant work in preparation for drilling, such as moving lumber and 
equipment onsite, building board roads, and staking a site.17 
The Second Circuit stated that work of the type performed by Ches­
apeake prior to the expiration of the primary term is sufficient to con­
stitute "operations for drilling" if the work is done in good faith, 
without undue delay, and that the work eventually leads to the drilling 
and completion of a well.18 Whether an operator is in good faith is 
judged in large part by its actions, such as whether it diligently works 
to complete a well.19 Here, Chesapeake had completed the well with­
out undue delay.20 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the dis­
trict court had not abused its discretion in holding that Chesapeake's 
acts of surveying, staking, and clearing were sufficient to constitute 
"operations for drilling" and to maintain the lease.21 
C. Mineral Code Article 207 Attorney Fees 
In Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., Mr. and Mrs. Adams agreed to grant 
a mineral lease to JPD Energy.22 They signed a lease form that pro­
vided for a one-eighth royalty, but both the Adamses and JPD later 
12. Id. at 438. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 440. 
15. Id. at 446. 
16. Id. at 442. 
17. See id. at 441-42. 
18. Id. at 442. 
19. See id. at 441. 
20. Id. at 443. 
21. See id. 
22. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 46 So. 3d 751, 752 (La. Ct. App. 2010). Ad­
ams involved a dispute regarding the validity of a lease and was decided prior to the 
time period covered in this Article. The case is discussed briefly as background for an 
attorney's fee dispute involving the same parties, which was decided during the period 
covered in this Article. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 87 So. 3d 161 (La. Ct. App. 
2012), writ denied, 89 So. 3d 1194 (La. 2012). 
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stated that the reference to a one-eighth royalty was erroneous.23 The 
Adamses sued to rescind the lease based on fraud or error, claiming 
that the parties had agreed to a one-fourth royalty.24 JPD asked the 
court to reform the lease, stating that the parties had agreed to a roy­
alty of one-fifth, not one-fourth as claime d  by. the Adamses.25 T.he district court held that the lease was null and v01d because the parties 
had failed to reach a "meeting of the minds. "26 The Louisiana Second 
Circuit affirmed.27 
After holding that the lease was unenforceable, the trial court 
awarded attorney's fees to the Adamses, relying on Mineral Code arti­
cle 207 ,28 which authorizes attorney's fees if a lessee fails to timely 
acknowledge the "expiration" of a lease.29 The Second Circuit re­
versed the attorney's fee award, holding that the nullity of a lease is 
not the same as the "expiration" of a lease because a mineral lease 
that is declared null is deemed never to have existed.30 
IL UNITS FOR ULTRA DEEP FORMATIONS 
Like other states, Louisiana generally applies the rule of capture.31 
But, as in some other states, Louisiana law authorizes a regulatory 
agency-in Louisiana, it is the Office of Conservation ("Office")-to 
enter compulsory unitization orders that modify the rule of capture.32 
Several statutes grant unitization authority to the Office for various 
situations. 
For example, Louisiana Revised Statute 30:9 authorizes the Office 
to create drilling units and states that "[a] drilling unit, as contem­
plated [therein], means the maximum area that can be efficiently and 
economically drained by one well." 33 Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5 
authorizes the Office to order pool-wide or field-wide units under cer­
tain circumstances, if at least 75% of the royalty owners in the area 
23. Adams, 46 So. 3d at 753. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 754. 
27. Id. at 756. 
28. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:207 (2000). This provision under title 31 may be 
referred to as article 207 of the Mineral Code. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:1 
(2000). 
29. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 87 So. 3d 161, 164 (La. Ct. App.  2012), writ 
denied, 89 So. 3d 1194 (La. 2012). 
30. Id. 
31. See, �.g., �arnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907); 
Kelly v. Oh10 Oil. C:o . . 4 9  N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § §  31:8, 31: 14 (2000) ( cod1fymg the substance of the rule of capture); see also Frey v. Amoco 
Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 178 (La. 1992) (referring to "rule of capture" by name). 
32. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:9 (2007); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.lO(A) 
(West, �est�aw through 2�12 Reg. S�ss.). In Louisiana, forced pooling and compul­
sory umt1zat1on orders ty�1�ally ar� issued simultaneously, and they often are refer­
enced by courts and practitioners simply as "unitization" orders. 
33. § 30:9. 
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consent to unitization.34 Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5.1 authorizes 
the Office to order pool-wide units, without the need for consent of 
75% of the owners in the area, but only if the pool is found at a depth 
of at least 15,000 feet.35 
Act 743 o f  the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature 
grants the Office additional unitization authority by enacting a new 
section to the existing Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5.1.36 The new 
section authorizes the Commissioner of Conservation ("Commis­
sioner") to declare units up to 9,000 acres in size for "ultra deep struc­
tures" that are anticipated to be encountered at a minimum depth of 
22,000 feet, with such units to be served by one or more unit wells.37 
The legislation defines "structure" as "a unique geologic feature that 
potentially traps hydrocarbons in one or more pools or zones. "38 
Before entering such an order, the Commissioner must find the fol­
lowing based on evidence presented at a public hearing: the order is 
reasonably necessary to prevent waste and the drilling of unnecessary 
wells, and to encourage the development of the ultra deep structure; 
the operations proposed by the party seeking unitization are economi­
cally feasible; sufficient evidence exists to establish the limits of the 
ultra deep structure; and the party seeking the unitization has submit­
ted a reasonable development plan that states the number of wells 
that the party intends to drill, an e stimated schedule for drilling, and 
the anticipated depth for each well.39 Each interested person is enti­
tled to review all the information submitted, including any seismic 
data submitted to establish the limits of the ultra deep structure.40 
III. RISK FEE STATUTE 
When a compulsory drilling unit is created, the proceeds from oil or 
gas produced from a unit well generally will be shared b y  all persons 
holding mineral rights in the unit.41 This rule can lead to a problem 
when various tracts of land within the unit are subject to mineral 
leases held b y  different lessees. Suppose one lessee-operator is will­
ing to drill a well, but another lessee is unwilling to participate by 
paying a share of drilling costs. Absent some provision to address this 
issue, there can be one of two results-either the non-participant's 
decision leads to a stalemate, and no well is drilled or the operator 
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5 (2007). 
35. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:5.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
36. The Acts of the Louisiana Legislature may be found at the legislature's web-
site. The URL for that site is http://www.legis.state.la.us/. 
37. § 30:5.l(B) (codifying this new section). 
38. Drilling Permits, No. 795, sec. 1, § 28(2), 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 795 (West). 
39. Id. 
40. § 30:5.l(B)(7). 
41. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:9 (2007). 
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pays all the costs of drilling and thus bears all the risk of a dry hole. 
Several states, including Louisiana, address this by Risk Fee Statutes. 
Louisiana's Risk Fee Statute42 allows an operator to propose a well 
to any other mineral lessees holding leases in the area.43 The operator 
makes the proposal by sending specified information regarding the 
proposed well to the other lessees, who have thirty days after receiv­
ing the proposal to give a reply stating whether they consent to "par­
ticipate" in the well.44 If a lessee timely agrees to participate, it 
becomes obligated to pay its proportionate share of drilling costs and 
will be entitled to its proportionate share of any proceeds from the 
well, starting with the first drop of product.45 On the other hand, if 
the lessee does not timely agree to participate, it will not be liable for 
any costs in the event of a dry hole.46 The non-participating lessee 
retains its right to receive its proportionate share of-production from 
the proposed well, but it does not begin to share in such production 
until the proceeds from production are sufficient to pay for the costs 
of drilling and operating the well three times over.47 
Act 743 amends Louisiana's Risk Fee Statute to require the opera­
tor of a unit well to pay certain funds to the non-participating lessee 
from the start of production, during the time that a non-participating 
lessee would not have been entitled to receive any proceeds under the 
pre-Act 743 version of the Risk Fee Statute.48 Namely, Act 743 re­
quires the operator to pay the non-participating lessee a portion of the 
proceeds of production sufficient to cover any lease royalties or over­
riding royalties owed by the nonparticipating lessee on the 
production. 49 
IV. PRE-ENTRY NOTICE TO SURFACE OWNERS 
Louisiana does not recognize mineral estates that create a perma­
nent separation of surface rights and mineral rights, but the state rec­
ognizes mineral servitudes.50 Mineral servitudes have many of the 
characteristics of a mineral estate,51 but a mineral servitude generally 
42. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Scss.). 
4J. Id. § 30: IO(A)(2). 
44. Id. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)(ii). 
45. Id. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)(i). 
46. Id. § 30:IO(A)(2)(b)(i). 
47. Id. § 30: IO(A)(2)(b) (stating that an operator may recover its costs plus a risk 
fee equal to twice its costs). 
48. �ooling of Oil and Gas Wells, No. 743, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 743 (West) 
(amending§ 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii)). 
49. Id. at sec. I. § IO(A)(2)(b)(ii) (codified as amended at LA REV STAT ANN 
§ 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii)). 
. . . . 
50. Frost-Joh.nson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1920); Wem­ple v. Nabors 01  & Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 668-69 (La. 1923). 
SI. LA. REv. STAT. ANN .§§ 31:21to 31:23 (2007). 
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will be extinguished by prescription of nonuse if it ever goes unused 
for a ten-year period.52 
A mineral servitude owner generally has a right to reasonable use 
of the surface for the purpose of exercising his servitud e  rights to ex­
plore for o r  produce minerals. 53 The servitude owner generally does 
not need the landowner's permission to enter the property, but com­
mon courtesy suggests that a servitude owner generally  should give 
the landowner notice before he enters the property. 
Under certain circumstances, legal notice will now be required. Act 
795 enacts Louisiana Revised Statute 30:28(1), which requires that op­
erators give notice to landowners at least thirty days prior to entering 
their land t o  drill. 54 The legislation does not require notice if the op­
erator has a contract with the landowner, the operator is entering the 
property only for pre-drilling acti vities (such as surveying), or the op­
erator is drilling an additional well from an existing well pad and the 
operator is not expanding the pad o r  the access road to the pad.55 For 
purposes of the pre-entry notice requirement, "surface owner" is de­
fined as the person or persons shown as the owner on the rolls of the 
local property assessor.56 
The Commissioner may grant a waiver of the thirty-day notice if 
waiting thirty days to enter the land would result in termination of a 
lease.57 The Commissioner may also waive the thirty-day requirement 
in emergency circumstances. 58 
V. LANDMEN AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE 
OF LAW ALLEGATIONS 
In Collins v. Godchaux, Collins was a landman who contracted to 
manage the m ineral interests of two landowners in return for a speci­
fied portion o f  any mineral revenue they received.59 After the land­
owners entered a settlement that resulted in an existing lease being 
amended and five new leases being executed, Collins and the land­
owners disagreed about Collins's right to a portion of the revenue the 
landowners received from the new leases and the amended lease.60 
Collins brought suit for the money he believed he was owed. 61 The 
landowners filed a counterclaim, asserting that the work performed by 
Collins constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and therefore 
52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27 (2007). 
53. §§ 31:21, 31:23. 
54. Drilling Permits, No. 795, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 795 (West) (enacting LA. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.)) . 
55. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(1)(1)(c), (e)-(f) (codified at§ 30:28(I)(l)(c), (e)-(f)). 
56. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(1)(2) (codified at § 30:28(1)(2)). 
57. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(I)(l)(d) (codified at § 30:28(I)(l)(d)). 
58. Id. 
59. Collins v. Godchaux, 86 So. 3d 831, 832 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
60. Id. at 833. 
61. Id. 
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they were entitled to a cancellation of their contract with Collins, as 
well as a reimbursement of the money they had already paid him. 62 
In support of their counterclaim, the landowners noted that Collins 
had negotiated contracts on their behalf.63 They also alleged that he 
had advised them about their legal rights.64 The district court 
agreed.65 It held that Collins had engaged in the unauthorized prac­
tice of law and that his contract with the landowners was void.6 6  But 
the court held that the landowners' "unclean hands" barred their re­
covery of the money they already had paid to Collins.67 
The Louisiana Third Circuit concluded that Collins had not given 
legal advice.68 Further, the Third Circuit concluded, citing to prior 
Louisiana Supreme Court opinions, that tasks which historically have 
been performed by landmen do not constitute the "unauthorized prac­
tice of law," even if some of those tasks appear to fit within Louisi­
ana's statutory definition of that phrase.69 Because the tasks 
performed by Collins were the types of tasks traditionally performed 
by landmen, he had not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.70 
VI. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
FLUID COMPOSITION 
A. Regulation Mandating Disclosure 
As reported in Texas Wesleyan's 2011 Oil & Gas Survey, the Louisi­
ana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") proposed a new reg­
ulation that would require operators to disclose information about the 
water used in hydraulic fracturing.71 The regulation, which went into 
effect on October 20, 2011, requires operators to disclose on a well-by­
well basis: 
• the volume of hydraulic fracturing fluid used; 
• the types of additives used (for example, biocides, corro­
sion inhibitors, friction reducers, etc.), as well as the vol­
ume of each type; 
• the trade name and supplier of each additive· and 
• a list of any chemical compounds contained \n the addi­
tives that qualify as hazardous under certain federal regu-
62. Id. at 834. 
63. Id. at 835. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 834. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 839. 
69. Id. _
at 838-39� LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:212(A)(l)-(2) (Supp. 2012) (d f · "unauthorized practice of law"). e mmg 
70. Collins. 86 So. 3d at 838-39. 
71. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118 (2011). 
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lations, along with the maximum concentration of each 
compound.72 
369 
The new regulation, found a t  Louisiana Administrative Code 
43.XIX.118, requires that the operator either include this information 
with the Well History Report, which must be filed with the Office of 
Conservation within twenty days after completion of the well, or sub­
mit a statement that the information is posted on the FracFocus web­
site that is operated by the Groundwater Protection Council.73 If the 
identity of the chemical compound is a trade secret, the operator is 
excused from identifying the compound but is required to identify the 
chemical family to which the compound belongs.74 
B. Statute Mandating Regulation 
The legislature enacted Act 812, which directs the Office to draft 
regulations for mandatory disclosure of hydraulic fracturing fluid 
composition-something that the Office had done even before Act 
812 was passed.75 The statute mandates that the regulations require 
disclosure within twenty days after completion of the hydraulic frac­
turing operations, whereas the existing regulations require disclosure 
within twenty days of completion of the well.76 Otherwise, Act 812 
appears to mandate regulatory requirements consistent with the ex­
isting regulations in Louisiana Administrative C9de 43.XIX.118.77 
VII. ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR PIPELINES BY 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
Federal statutes and the statutes of many states provide procedures 
for private companies to acquire property by eminent domain for cer­
tain purposes, such as the construction of natural gas pipelines. The 
owners from whom such property is acquired are entitled to compen­
sation, but the process can proceed very quickly, and property owners 
generally cannot block an acquisition. The process is called "condem-
72. Id. 
73. Id.; see also LA. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 105 (2011) (setting the twenty­
day deadline for filing the Well History Report). 
74. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118. 
75. Hydraulic Fracturing, No. 812, 2012 La. Sess. Law. Serv. 812 (West) [herein af­
ter Hydraulic Fracturing, No. 812]; LA. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118. 
76. Compare LA. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118, with Hydraulic Fracturing, 
No. 812. 
77. LA. ADMIN. CooE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118. 
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nation" under federal law78 and the law of many states,79 but typically 
is called "expropriation" in Louisiana.80 
During its 2012 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted 
Act 702, which was signed into law by Governor Jindal.81 The Act 
amends existing statutes regarding expropriation, including Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 19:2 and 19:2.2.82 The amendments leave the power 
of expropriation intact and attempt to ensure that the process of ex­
propriation can still proceed relatively quickly, but the amendments 
also take modest steps to protect landowners from unfairness in the 
process.83 
For example, prior law allowed a company that had the powe r  of 
expropriation (an "expropriating authority") to file a petition for ex­
propriation whenever "a price cannot be agreed upon with the 
owner. "84 Prior law did not require the expropriating authority to ne­
gotiate with the landowner in good faith in an attempt to reach an 
agreement with the landowner without resort to an expropriation ac­
tion. 85 Act 702 requires a company to make a "good faith" attempt to 
reach an agreement with a property owner regarding compensation 
prior to filing an expropriation action.86 In those negotiations, the 
company must offer compensation at least equal to the lowest ap­
praised value of the property or property rights to be acquired.87 
Prior law did not require an expropriating authority to give a land­
owner a reasonable period to consider the authority's offer to 
purchase the property.88 Act 702 provides that, at least thirty days 
before filing an expropriation action, the expropriating authority must 
send a letter to the property owner by certified mail, stating (1) the 
�egal basis by which the company could exercise expropriation author­
ity; (2) the purpose and conditions of the proposed acquisition of 
pr?perty; and (3) the compensation the company proposes to pay.89 
With the letter, the authority also must include a copy of all appraisals 
that the company has obtained of the property to be acquired; a plat 
78. See, e.g .. Mars. & Ne. Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Deccoulas 146 F. App'x 495 496 (1st 
Cir. 2005); m cilso 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006). 
' 
' 
79. s('(', e.g .• Tt'.X. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.00I(c)(7)(a) (West 2008 & Supp. 
2012); T�x. Gov'T Coot.: ANN.§ 2206.051 (Supp. 2012). 
80. Se<' LA. Rt'V. STAT. Ar:iN. § 19:2 (West. Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 81. Press Release. La. Office of the Governor, Governor Jindal Signs Bills and 
Issues Veto�s (Ju�c 15. 2012), http://www.gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom 
&tmp=deta1l&art1clclD=3480. 
82 . . \:1·1• �xpropriation. No. 702. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 702 (West). 8.l .'i<•e 1d. 
84. § 19:2. 
85. St'<' id; .H'<' a/.w LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 19:2.2 (West, Westlaw current through 
2012 Reg. Scss.). 
86. See Expropriation. No. 702. 
87. See id. 
HR See § 19:2; see also § 19:2.2. 
89. Expropriation. No. 702. 
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showing the boundaries of the proposed acquisition; a description of 
any proposed above-ground facilities that the company proposes to 
place on the property and the location where the facilities will be lo­
cated; and a statement of the "considerations for the proposed route 
or area to be acquired."90 
VIII. CONTAMINATION LITIGATION (AiKlA "LEGACY LITIGATION") 
Since the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Corbello v. Iowa 
Production,91 plaintiffs have filed a large number of "legacy litigation" 
actions, asserting that their property w as contaminated by past oil and 
gas activity.92 
As the number of those suits began to multiply, people began to 
express concern that plaintiffs could receive large money judgments 
that were based on the estimated cost of remediating property, but 
that plaintiffs were not required to spend the money on remediation.93 
Thus, the contamination might remain a threat to the environment. 
And, if a plaintiff failed to use a money judgment to clean-up his 
property, a company that already had paid that judgment might face 
the possibility of having to pay again-this time, for a clean-up or­
dered by regulators.94 Another concern was that plaintiffs' experts 
and defendants' experts often expressed very different opinions about 
what type of  clean-up was appropriate, and jurors and judges who 
lacked expertise in environmental science were being called upon to 
choose between such competing t estimony. 
In its 2006 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 
312, which addresses these two concerns.95 It established a process by 
which the Louisiana Office of Conservation would hold hearings and 
issue its opinion regarding what clean-up was appropriate.96 Al-
90. Id. 
91. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003). . . 92. In Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.l (La. 2010), the �u1s1-
ana Supreme Court stated: "Legacy litigation" refers. to hundre�s of cases filed by landowners seeking damages from oil and gas explorat10n compames for alleged envi­
ronmental damage in the wake of this Court's decision in Corbello v. Iowa Produc­
tion. These types of actions are known as "legacy litigation" because they often arise 
from operations conducted many decades ago, leaving an unwanted "legacy" in the 
form of actual or alleged contamination. See Loulan Pitre, Jr., "Legacy Litigation" 
and Acts 312 of 2006, 20 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 347, 347-49 (2007). . . 93. In her concurring opinion in M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Justice 
Johnson noted that the legislature's intent i n  enacting "Act 312" was to require that 
damages awards be spent on clean-up. 998 So. 2d 16, 39 (La. 2008) (Johnson, J., 
concurring). 
94. Although the concern about double exposure heightened after �he number ?f 
legacy litigation cases increased, the conce�n had be�n expressed �arher, s�c� as m 
the concurring opinion of Justice Lemmon m Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Ph1l/1ps 011 
Co., 576 So. 2d 475, 486 (La. 1991) (Lemmon, J., concurring). . . 95. Remediation, No. 312, 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 312 (West) (cod1f1ed at LA. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.)). 
96. Id. 
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though parties could offer their own remediation plans, the Office of 
Conservation's plan might provide some guidance to the judge or 
jury.97 Second, assuming a defendant was found liable and that it pa�� 
a money judgment, the money would have to be spent on clean-up. 
But a number of other issues remained unresolved, some of which 
were spawned by Act 312 itself. 
A. Act 779-Reforms Relating to Procedure and 
Admissions of Liability 
During its 2012 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature adopted 
two bills to address legacy litigation issues.99 One of the issues ad­
dressed by the legislation was one that sometimes has been disputed 
by parties in legacy litigation-whether a party has the right to sub­
poena employees of the Office of Conservation or Department of 
Natural Resources in order to compel testimony about their work in 
helping the Office devise a recommendation for a remediatio n  plan. 100 
Act 779 enacts a new section of Louisiana Revised Statute 30:29 that 
authorizes parties in legacy litigation to subpoena any Office "em­
ployee, contractor, or representative" for testimony at a deposition or 
trial if that person was involved in formulating the remediation plan 
recommended by the Office. 101 
Another issue of controversy is the large number of defendants 
named in legacy lawsuits. Plaintiffs often name many-sometimes 
dozens-companies and individuals as defendants in legacy litiga­
tion. '02 and in some cases, the plaintiffs may not have evidence to link 
some of the defendants to the alleged contamination. Act 779 estab­
lishes a procedure whereby a defendant may request a hearing at 
which the plaintiff has the initial burden of introducing evidence of 
environmental damages.103 If the plaintiff introduces such evidence, 
the defendant has the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant is legally re­
sponsible for the contamination.104 
97. Ste id. 
98. Id. 
99. Ste Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites. 
No. 779, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 779 (West); Liability for Environmental Damage, 
No. 754, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 754 (West). 
100. Stt. t.g .. Tensas Poppadoc. Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 49 So. 3 d  1020, 
1024-26 (La. 2010). writ granted and cast remanded, 58 So. 3d 473 (La. 2011 ). 
IOI. See Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites 
No. 779 (amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg: 
Scs..-;.)). 
I 02. For example. the plaintiffs named "[a ]pproximately 25 defendants." M.J. 
Farms. Ltd . v . .  E�xon Mo.nil Coll? .. 998 So. 2d 16, 20 n.2 (La. 1991). 103. Rcmcd1a1ton of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites No 
779. ' 
. 
104. See id. 
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If a defendant establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact, the court must dismiss that defendant without prejudice.105 If 
another party later discovers evidence that the dismissed defendant 
may have liability, the party may cause the dismissed defendant to be 
rejoined to the litigation.106 If the dismissed defendant is never re­
joined, the defendant is entitled to a dismissal with prejudice when the 
litigation ends in a final, non-appealable judgment.107 
Louisiana has a relatively short limitations period for tort claims­
one year.108 Although the running of the limitations period may be 
suspended by the discovery rule, Louisiana jurisprudence provides 
that the limitations period begins to run as soon as a plaintiff knows 
facts that w ould cause a reasonable person to inquire about potential 
harm, even if the plaintiff does not yet have facts sufficient to point to 
a particular defendant.109 Act 779 provides running o f  the limitations 
period is suspended for one year if a person who suspects his property 
is contaminated submits to the Office of Conservation a "notice of 
intent to investigate" that meets certain requirements.110 
Act 779 also contains other provisions. For example, the Act pro­
hibits parties from engaging in ex parte communications with the Of­
fice of Conservation during the time that the Office is considering 
proposed remediation plans.111 The Act authorizes the Office to issue 
compliance orders for remediation after a person admits liability or is 
found liable for contamination.112 Finally, if a party admits liability, 
the Act requires that party to waive any contractual indemnification 
rights it might have for any punitive damages arising from the 
contamination.113 
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
108. See LA. CJv. CooE ANN. art. 3492 (2011) (one-year prescriptive period for 
delictual actions); see also LA. C1v. CooE ANN. art. 3493 (2011). A "delictual action" 
is a tort action. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 
F.3d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 2002). In Louisiana, limitations periods that correspond to 
what many jurisdictions would call a "statute of limitations" are called a period of 
"liberative prescription." See LA. CJv. CooE ANN. art. 3447 (2007). 
109. M arin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 245-46 (La. 2010). Under Louisi­
ana jurisprudence, the "discovery rule" is one of four categories of contra non 
valentem, a doctrine which can suspend the running of liberative prescription. Id. 
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B. Act 754-Additional Provisions Relating to Procedure and 
Admissions of Liability 
The other legislation relating to legacy litigation was Act 754, which 
enacts Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1552 and 1563.114 
Parties in legacy litigation sometimes have disputes regarding testing 
and inspection of allegedly contaminated property. Act 754 permits 
any party, or the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources 
("LDNR"), to request that the court direct attorneys for the parties in 
legacy litigation to appear before LDNR to develop an environmental 
management order that authorizes all parties to have access to the 
property for inspection and testing and establishes time periods and 
protocols for testing and inspection.115 Such an order must provide 
that any test results must be disclosed to all parties and LDNR within 
thirty days. 116 If the test results are not disclosed, the party that failed 
to disclose the results is barred from offering the results into 
evidence.117 
Another issue has been whether defendants could pay for a 
remediation or admit liability for contamination without admitting lia­
bility for other damages claimed by plaintiffs. Act 754 permits de­
fendants to admit responsibility for implementing a plan to evaluate, 
and if necessary, remediate all or a portion of any contamination with­
out admitting liability for other alleged damages. 118 Once a party ad­
mits liability for remediation, the matter is referred to LDNR for a 
public hearing on the most feasible plan for a remediation.119 
C. Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine 
When a person purchases property that contains contamination that 
is not readily apparent, and the seller does not expressly assign to the 
huycr any claims against third parties for damages arising from the 
cont.amination , Does the buyer have a cause of action against third 
parties? Under the "subsequent purchaser doctrine," the cause of ac­
tion against third parties would remain with the seller, and the buyer 
would not have such a cause of action. Until recently, it was unclear 
whether the subsequent purchaser doctrine applies under Louisiana 
law.1211 
114. Liahility. for Environmental Damage, No. 754, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 754 (West) (amcndm� LA. Com; C1v. PRoc. ANN. art. 1552, 1563). 115. /ti. 
I lt1. Id. 
117. Id. 
I IX. Id. 
II Y. Id . 
. 




noted that.'' ha� granted revi�� in part to address whether the subsequent pur�h.1.�cr doctrine apphes �ndcr Lou1s1ana law, but that the court ultimately had not rcachcd the '�'uc hccausc 1t had resolved the case on other grounds. Id. 
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In Eagle Pipe & Supply Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., the Louisiana 
Supreme Court resolved the question, at least with respect to tort 
claims, by holding that the subsequent purchaser doctrine applies.121 
In Eagle Pipe, the plaintiff purchased land that previously had been 
used for the removal of scale from the interior of oilfield piping.122 
Such scale sometimes contains naturally occurring radioactive mate­
rial ("NORM") that originates from the formations from which oil or 
gas is produced. Subsequent to the purchase, the Louisiana Depart­
ment of Environmental Quality performed an inspection and discov­
ered the land was contaminated with NORM.123 The contamination 
had not been readily apparent.124 
The plaintiff brought a claim against the seller.125 The plaintiff also 
brought claims against various trucking companies that allegedly had 
transported pipes to the site and against several oil and gas companies 
that allegedly owned the pipes that were cleaned at the site.126 The 
Court held that a cause of action for contamination generally belongs 
to the person who owned the land at the time of contamination, and, 
absent an assignment of the cause of action, a subsequent purchaser 
has no right of action against third parties, such as the trucking com­
panies and oil and gas companies that might have fault for the con­
tamination.127 The Court expressly noted, however, that it was not 
expressing an opinion on whether a similar result would apply in a 
case involving defendants that were parties to a mineral lease relating 
to the contaminated land.128 
D. Extent of Remediation Damages 
In Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., the State of 
Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed three lawsuits, 
seeking remediation of certain public properties that the plaintiffs al­
leged had been contaminated by the oil and gas activity of UNOCAL 
and other defendants.129 UNOCAL admitted responsibility. UNO­
CAL then filed a motion for a partial summary judgment, stating that 
Act 312 limited its liability to the amount of money needed to fund a 
"feasible plan" approved by the court pursuant to Louisiana Revised 
121. Eagle Pipe & Supply Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011). 
122. Id. at 253-54. 
123. Id. at 254. 
124. Id. at 257. 
125. Id. at 253. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 283. 
128. See id. at 281 n.80. 
129. See Louisiana v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 85 So . 3d 158 (La. Ct. App.). 
writ granted. 92 So. 3d 340 (La. 2012). 
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Statute 30:29. 130 The court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs 
appealed. 13 1  
The Third Circuit examined the language of Revised Statute 30:29, 
including 30:29(H), which states in part: 
This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a 
judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suf­
fered as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise pro­
vided in this Section. Nor shall it preclude a judgment ordering 
damages for or implementation of additional remediation in excess 
of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to 
this Section as may be required in accordance with the terms of an 
express contractual provision.132 
The "plan adopted by the court" refers to a plan to remediate the 
property to regulatory standards. 
Some readers of the statute might conclude that, because the statute 
expressly allows claims for remediation in excess of the regulatory 
standard whenever a more rigorous remediation is "required [by] an 
express contractual provision," the statute implies that claims for a 
more rigorous remediation are not allowed in  the absence of an ex­
press contractual provision. The Third Circuit concluded, however, 
that the statute should be interpreted otherwise. 133 The Third Circuit 
stated that, " La. R.S. 30:29, by its clear language, provides for a land­
owner to recover damages in excess of those determined in the feasi­
ble plan whether they be based on tort or contract law." 1 34 The Third 
Circuit therefore reversed the trial court's judgment that the defend­
ants' liability was limited to funding the "feasible plan" approved by 
the court pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 30:29. u:i; 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has agreed to review the Third Cir­
cuit's ruling.1 .� 
IX. SECTION 16 MINERAL RIGHTS 
"Section 16" lands are certain lands formerly owned by the federal 
government that the United States has transferred to the states for the 
purpose of supporting public schools. D7 In Louisiana, the state has 
r�tained ownership. 
of Section 16 land , 1 JS but a Louisiana statute pro­
vides th�t each pansh school board has the right, in its own name, to 
�rant mineral leases covering any such lands within the school board's 
I JO. Id. RI I �9. 
I J  I .  1'/. RI 160. 
I J� .  Id. al 161 -62. 
l .H Id. RI l 62-6J. 
I .'-I l1J. RI  162. 
I J�. Id. 
l .lti L.oui�iana ... . �- Land & Exploralion Co .
• 
92 So. 3d 340 (La. 2012). 1.'7. \ crm
�1on Pan5h Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co .• 83 So. 3d 1234. 1237-38 (La. n. App. 201 ... ) . 
I J� . .'it'r id. al I 2Jt(. 
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parish. 139 Further, a school board has the right to keep all revenue 
from such leases.140 
In late 2005 and early 2006, the Vermilion Parish School Board 
("VPSB ") brought three related actions, asserting that various de­
fendants had underpaid it for royalties owed on mineral leases VPSB 
had granted for Section 16 lands.141 The alleged underpayments re­
lated to oil produced during the early 1990s, more than ten years 
before VPSB filed suit.142 This led to a potential timeliness issue be­
cause the general limitations period for royalty claims i n  Louisiana is 
three years. 143 
Further, for several years, VPSB had been aware of facts that would 
make it difficult for VPSB to reasonably assert that the running of the 
limitations period had been suspended by the discovery rule-indeed, 
VPSB eventually stipulated in e a ch of the three cases that the discov­
ery rule would not apply and that its royalty claims were time-barred 
unless the claims were immune from "liberative prescription,"144 the 
equivalent of a statute of limitations. 145 The defendants asserted that 
the claims were not immune from prescription because, although the 
state itself is immune from prescription, that immunity does not ex­
tend to local government or political subdivisions, such as school 
boards. 146 Each of the three cases was before a different district court 
judge, and each dismissed the VPSB's claims, holding that the claims 
were not immune from prescription and that the claims therefore 
were time-barred.147 
On appeal, VPSB did not assert that it was entitled to immunity 
from prescription in its own right. 148 VPSB argued, however, that it 
1 39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:152 (2007). 
1 40. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:154 (Supp. 2012). 
1 4 1 .  See ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1 236. The Author of this Article was lead 
counsel for ConocoPhillips Co., the primary defendant in one of the three cases, and 
was lead counsel for Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. in one of the other two re· 
lated cases. 
1 42.  Id. 
1 43. LA. Ctv. CooE ANN. art. 3494 (20 1 1 ). 
144. The fact is not readily apparent from the Louisiana Third Circuit's opinion: 
hut it is stated in a brief filed by ConocoPhillips, and is not disputed in either the 
Board"s original brief or reply brief. Compare Brief for Appellee at l. Vermilion 
Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co .• 83 So. 3d 1234 (2012) (No. 1 1 -009999-CA). 
20 1 1  WL 5 1 1 7380, with Brief for Appellant at 6, Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. Co­
nocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (201 1 )  (No. 1 1 -00999·CA),  20 1 1  WL 4826847, and 
Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 
So. 3d 1234 (201 1 )  (No. 1 1-00999-CA), 201 1 WL 5563588. 
145. LA. C1v. CooE ANN. art. 3447 (201 1 ) . 
146. La. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Pineville, 403 So. 2d 49, 53 (La. 198 1) . 
147. ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1234 (Judge Everett): Id. at 1 23 6  (dismissal of all 
three cases based on prescription); Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. Amerada Hess Corp .. 
83 So. 3d 1 242 , 1 242 (La. Ct. App. 201 2 )  (Judge Trahan): Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. 
UNOCAL Corp., 83 So. 3d 1242, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (Judge Duplantier). 
148. On appeal, the parties' briefing narrowed the issues relating to the VPSB"s 
assertion that it was immune from prescription. See Brief for Appellee at I .  Vermil-
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was not asserting claims on behalf of itself.149 VPSB argued that the 
statute that gives school boards the authority to grant mineral lea�es 
in their own names for Section 1 6  lands does not grant executive 
rights to school boards.150 Instead, it merely makes school boards the 
leasing agents for the state.151 Moreover, argued VPSB, the s
_
tatute 
that gives school boards the right to keep all revenue from Section 16 
mineral leases does not grant certain mineral rights to school 
boards. 1 52 Instead, it appropriates certain money-the state's Section 
16 mineral lease revenue-to school boards. 1 53 Thus, argued VPSB, 
the royalty claims asserted by VPSB were royalty claims that be­
longed to the state, not VPSB, and VPSB was asserting claims on be­
half of the state. 1 54 The Louisiana Third Circuit agreed, holding that 
the royalty claims were immune from prescription.155 The appellate 
court therefore reversed the dismissals of each of the three cases and 
remanded for further proceedings. 1 56 
X. CLAIMS BY UNLEASED OWNERS 
In Wells v. Zadeck, an unleased mineral rights owner brought a 
claim for proceeds from production that were owed to him, but which 
had never been paid to him.157 The parties disputed the timeliness of 
the plaintiff's claim. 1 58 In resolving the issues before it, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that a claim by an unleased owner is a quasi­
contractual claim that is governed by the ten-year prescriptive period 
established by Civil Code article 3499, rather than the three-year pre­
scriptive period established for royalty claims by Civil Code article 
3494. 1 59 
ion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (2012) (No. 1 1 -009999-CA), 
20 1 1  W L  5 1 .1 7�80: For ex.ample, Civil Code article 3494, the provision that imposes a three-year hm.itat10ns
_ penod for royalty claims, states that the article does not apply to roy_alty claims denved from "state owned property." One might think that the prov1s1on might help VPSB given that the state owns Section 16 lands. But the de­
fendants argued that lease royalties derive from ownership of mineral rights, not from 
mere ownership .of land, and that the phrase "state owned property" means state owned mmeral n&hts, not state. owned land. By the time the cases were on appeal, VPSB was not senously contestmg the defendants' reading of Civil Code article 3494. 
149. ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1 24 1 .  
1 50. Id. a t  1 237. 
1 5 1 .  Id. at 1240. 
1 52. Id. at 1239. 
1 53 .  Id. at 1 240. 
1 54. Id. at 1237. 
155. Id. at 1 241 . 
� 56. Id. ; Vermilion Paris�. Sch. B� l v. Amerada Hess Corp., 83 So. 3d 1242 1242 (La. Ct. App. 2012); Verm1hon Pansh Sch. Bd.  v. UNOCAL Corp 83 S 3d, 1242 1 242 (La. Ct. App. 201 2) .  . ,  o .  , 
1 57 .  Wells v. Zadeck, 89 So. 3d 11 45, 1146 (La. 2012) .  1 58. Id. at 1 1 46-50. 
1 59. Id. 
